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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of increased trade on wage 
inequality in developing countries, and whether a higher human capital stock 
moderates this effect. We look at the skilled-unskilled wage differential. High 
initial endowments of human capital imply a more egalitarian society. When 
more equal societies open up their economies further, increased trade is likely 
to induce less inequality on impact because the supply of skills better matches 
demand. But greater international exposure also brings about technological 
diffusion, further raising skilled labour demand. This may raise wage inequality, 
in contrast to the initial egalitarian level effect of human capital. We attempt to 
measure these two opposing forces. We also employ a broad set of openness 
indicators to measure trade liberalization policies as well as general openness, 
which is an outcome, and not a policy variable. We further examine what type 
of education most reduces inequality. Our findings suggest that countries with 
a higher level of initial human capital do well on the inequality front, but 
human capital which accrues through the trade liberalization channel has 
inegalitarian effects. One explanation could be that governments in developing 
countries invest more in higher education at the expense of primary education 
in order to gain immediate benefits from globalization; thus becoming prone 
to wage inequality after increased international trade. Our results also have 
implications for the speed at which trade policies are liberalized, the 
implication being that better educated nations should liberalize faster. 
 
Keywords 
trade liberalization, wages, economic disparity, skills development, education, 
human resources 
JEL Classifications: F-15, I-3 
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THE EDUCATION BIAS OF 'TRADE LIBERALIZATION' 
AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES* 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The benefits of accelerated globalization since 1980 have been quite unequally 
distributed among developing nations, disadvantaging sub-Saharan Africa, and 
even Latin American countries in terms of either negative or indifferent 
growth rates (Murshed, 2003). This has occurred, despite the fact that most of 
these nations have become more open in the sense of rising shares of 
international trade in national income. Associated with this phenomenon of 
increasing openness is rising within-nation income inequality post-1980. 
Increased trade, particularly of the inter-industry variety, alters the composition 
of output in the economy away from non-traded goods towards traded 
products. This will impact on the functional distribution of income, usually 
raising the demand for the factor of production employed intensively in the 
traded sector. In the developed world it is skilled labour, and we have 
witnessed an increase in the skilled-unskilled labour relative wage premium. In 
many OECD countries this has meant a more unequal personal distribution of 
income. As far as developing countries are concerned, especially in those that 
export unskilled labour intensive manufactured goods, we would expect a fall 
in the skilled-unskilled labour relative wage premium leading to reduced 
inequality, since the unskilled are more numerous within the population. But 
this is generally not true, and inequality in the developing world has also risen, 
mirroring events in the OECD. What accounts for this paradox? It may be that 
developing countries have such vast quantities of unskilled labour that the 
unskilled wage will not respond to increased demand. This is certainly likely in 
cross-country studies where China and India are included. Alternatively, other 
less populous developing countries may be exporting relatively more skilled 
labour intensive products such as semi-conductors, or capital intensive 
commodities as is the case with fuels and minerals. Finally, an expansion in 
international trade may raise the demand for, and reward of, skilled labour 
even when the country in question is exporting unskilled labour intensive 
products due to skill shortages and other factor complementarities. 
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade 
liberalization and income inequality. A recent paper by Dollar and Kraay 
(2004) concludes that liberalization does not significantly affect the distribution 
of income, and at most the relationship is of neutral nature. However their 
results have been widely challenged, because of their methodology and variable 
choice (Ravallion, 2003; and Amann et al, 2002). Ravallion (2003) points out 
that increased openness can lead to a rise in the demand for relatively skilled 
labour, which tends to be more unequally distributed in poor relative to rich 
countries. Arbache, Dickerson and Green (2004) find that imported 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Arjun Bedi for valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
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technology has raised the relative demand for highly skilled labour in Brazil 
and thus lowered the relative wages of less educated groups. Behrman, Birdsall 
and Szekely (2001) observe that inequality has increased in 7 out of 18 Latin 
American countries that initiated market reforms in the mid 1980s. Jayasuriya 
(2002), accepts that trade liberalization may have reduced consumption poverty 
in South Asia, but is sceptical about the so-called neutral distributional effects 
of liberalization. Many suggest that the distribution of the positive effects of 
liberalization is some what skewed towards urban households rather than rural 
ones, and to wealthy rather than poor households. See for example, Chen and 
Ravallion (2003), Cockburn (2001), Friedman (2000), Lofgren (1999). The 
evidence in this regard comes mainly from the Latin American region primarily 
because most of the economies there undertook rigorous reform policies in the 
mid 1980s following the debt crisis in that decade. Legovini, Bouillon and 
Lustig (2001) find that inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 
1994, and rising returns to skilled labour accounted for 20 % of the increase in 
the inequality in household income. Similarly, Hanson and Harrison (1999) 
find that the reduction in tariffs and the elimination of import licenses 
accounts for 23 % of the increase in the relative wages of skilled labour during 
1986-1990, thus providing evidence for the role liberalization played in rising 
inequality in Mexico. Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Venezuela, also show that skilled workers received increased premiums after 
liberalization when compared to their unskilled counterparts (World Bank, 
2001b). So the balance of the evidence points to increased globalization 
inducing greater income inequality.  
Irrespective of the exact nature of the cause of trade induced inequality, it 
is sensible to presume that nations with higher stocks of human capital will 
experience less of the unequalising spiral consequent upon globalization and 
trade liberalization. Investment in education may yield a double dividend. It 
can not only promote growth, but also suppresses inequality by both 
bequeathing skills as well as moderating rises in skill-premia following an 
expansion of international trade. More generally, Tinbergen (1975) pointed out 
that changes in wage inequality are a result of the opposing forces that 
technological change (skilled labour demand) and education (skilled labour 
supply/ human capital) exert on relative wages. Eiche and Garcia-Penalosa 
(2001: 19) suggest that human capital accumulation plays a dual role in 
development because the stock of educated workers in an economy determines 
both the degree of income inequality and its rate of growth, making the 
parameters of the demand for and supply of labour crucial determinants as to 
whether inequality increases or decreases as an economy accumulates human 
capital.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of increased trade on 
inequality, and furthermore investigate whether a higher human capital stock 
moderates this unequalising aspect of international trade. We specifically look 
at the skilled-unskilled wage differential. High initial endowments of human 
capital, captured by data on average years of schooling say, imply a more 
egalitarian society compared to countries with a lower human capital 
endowment. When more equal societies open up their economies further, 
increased trade is likely to induce less inequality upon impact because the 
supply of skills better matches demand. But greater international exposure also 
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brings about technological diffusion, see Winters (2004), further raising skilled 
labour demand. This may raise wage inequality, in contrast to the initial 
egalitarian level effect of human capital. We attempt to measure these two 
opposing forces. An innovation of our paper is to employ a broad set of 
openness indicators to measure trade liberalization policies as well as general 
openness, which is an outcome, and not a policy variable. Another purpose of 
our analysis is to examine what type of education most reduces inequality. In 
settings of low human capital endowments, as measured by literacy or low 
primary school enrollment, a policy of relative neglect of primary in favour of 
expenditure on tertiary education may have a less than benign influence on 
inequality. Our sample of countries (see appendix 4) excludes developed 
nations and economies in transition because of higher stocks of human capital 
in those regions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
presents the data and methodology, section 3 contains the empirical results, 
and finally section 4 concludes with some policy implications. 
2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
We employ the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality ‘THEIL’ measure calculated by 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) based on UNIDO 2001. This 
data set is a set of measures of the dispersion of pay across industrial categories 
in the manufacturing sector, drawn from the Industrial database published 
annually by United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). 
The Theil index is decomposable (Conceicao and Galbraith, 2000). If 
individuals are grouped in a mutually exclusive, completely exhaustive way, 
overall inequality can be separated into a between group component and a 
within group component. Thus, there is no interaction between these two 
components and so one can consider these measures additively decomposable. 
Moreover, of all entropy based measures, the Theil Index is the one of only 
two measures for which the weights in the within-groups component add to 
one. Therefore, overall inequality is the result of adding the two independent 
components: inequality between groups and inequality within groups.  
Here we have decided to employ the Theil index or more specifically a 
measure of inequality in manufacturing pay between skilled and unskilled 
labour, instead of taking measures of absolute inequality which would capture 
the personal income distribution (GINI). This is motivated by several 
considerations. First, comparable and consistent measures of income 
inequality, whether on a household level or per head basis are difficult, almost 
implausible and generally fails to provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and 
cross-country coverage. By contrast, inequality of manufacturing pay, based on 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that are more 
stable, more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO 
measures are based on a two or three digit code of International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC), a single systematic accounting framework. 
Furthermore, manufacturing pay has been measured with reasonable accuracy 
as a matter of official routine in most countries around the world for nearly 
forty years (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).  
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Secondly, pay is major source of household income. Any change in wage 
inequality is reflected in income inequality. According to Fields (1980) pay 
inequalities in the manufacturing sector have been found out to be the driving 
force behind the evolution of inequality. Furthermore, as discussed above, 
processes of globalization through technological change raises the 
concentration of skilled workers in advanced sectors against unskilled worker 
in the backward sector. Since manufacturing is the sector most affected by 
modern technological change, income inequality would certainly have an inter-
industrial feature that would show up in changing pay differentials between 
advanced and backward manufacturing industries (Galbraith and Kum, 2002).  
Thirdly, our principal reason for using the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality 
‘THEIL’ measure is because we are more interested in the functional 
distribution of income. Changes in the functional distribution between skilled 
and unskilled labour, will in turn predictably impact on the personal income 
distribution in countries that are unskilled labour abundant. Inequality will rise 
as the skilled-unskilled labour wage premium increases and vice versa.  
The UTIP- UNIDO wage inequality measure is the between-group 
component of Theil’s T statistic, an entropy measure whose functional form is 
defined as:  
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Where and indicate within-group and between-group inequality measures 
respectively. and stand for total employment and total pay respectively, and 
subscript denotes group identity. As mentioned, UTIP captures as their 
inequality measure, where groups are defined as categories within the UNIDO 
industrial classification codes. Like GINI, the Theil index range from 0 to 1. 
However, strictly speaking the , which only captures a part of inequality, ranges 
from 0 to less than 1 (0.36 for the current UNIDO data set). 
The UTIP data set provides Theil inequality measures for nearly 3200 
country/year observations, covering over 150 countries during the period 1963 
to 1999. Figure 1 illustrates trends in wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers over time in selected developing countries and is 
representative of different regions. All the country graphs, except one, show 
that wage inequality has been on the rise in 1980s and 1990s. The only 
exception is Singapore which belongs to a group associated with the “East 
Asian Miracle” of the 1980s. This miracle, however, was confined to a few 
countries, and is not representative of the developing world, as is evident from 
the graphs. Since 1980s and 1990s are associated with ‘Structural Adjustment 
Policies’ under which many developing countries embraced trade liberalization, 
it is safe to suggest that the above trends in wage inequality are related to these 
market reforms. Appendix 4 lists these countries, and the latest year for which 
the Theil wage inequality index was available for them.  
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Our basic model for wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers 
based on integration will have 2 equations: 
]),([ 0SkillsOpennessnIntegratiofInequality =  (2) 
  (+) (-) 
]),([ 0SkillsyTradePolicnIntegratiofInequality =  (3) 
 (+) (-) 
Here wage inequality is a positive function of integration, which in turn is 
positively related to the degree of the openness of the economy in equation (2), 
or trade policies that promote greater openness in equation (3). The latter effect 
is often ignored in the literature, which only employs openness indicators. It 
should be noted, however, that openness is an outcome of trade and industrial 
policies and not a policy indicator per se. Wage inequality is also negatively 
related to the initial stock of skills in the economy as discussed above. A simple 
Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson model would suggest that the overall 
returns to skill would decline, and with it incentives for education, when a skill-
scarce developing country opens up (see Wood and Ridao-Cano, 1999). 
However, in a multi-dimensional Stolper-Samuelson model approximating 
reality, endogenous growth with increasing returns to R & D, a skill-bias in 
tradables, skill shortages, or unlimited supplies of unskilled labour, could all 
lead to an increase in returns to skill following greater integration (Arbache et 
al., 2004). Integration can also lead to the diffusion of more efficient education 
technologies which would further augment the level of skills in the economy 
(Winters, 2004). Thus the expected effect of openness and trade policy on 
wage inequality is positive in developing countries where majority of the 
population is unskilled and uneducated. 
The econometric form of the wage inequality model based on openness 
and trade policy is as follows: 
 iiii skillsOPENTHEIL 11111 65 ενκσ +++=   (4) 
 iiii skillsTPTHEIL 22222 65 ενκσ +++=  (5) 
Where is wage inequality in a country i for the decade of 1990s (the latest 
value available for the Theil index for every country is employed: see appendix 
4 for the exact year), is the random error term, captures openness and is the 
indicator for the trade policy stance in 1980s respectively, and measures initial 
skill levels proxied by average years of schooling for the population aged 25 in 
1965 (see appendix 3 for data details). Note that the skill acquisition parameter 
refers to a period well before the trade liberalizations episodes post-1980. We 
will employ a total of 17 measures of openness and 11 measures of trade policy 
to carry out multiple regression analysis for equations 4 and 5, respectively. 
The core openness variable is the overall trade share (the ratio of nominal 
imports plus exports to GDP), which has been extensively used in the 
literature (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
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2001; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; and Rodrik et al, 
2004). Two other measures of openness are trade penetration (tars) derived 
from World Bank’s TARS system and overall import penetration (Impen) 
respectively. Following the study by Rose(2002), we have employed 8 different 
categories of trade penetration and import penetration respectively. However, 
these variables are an outcome and not policy variables as neither of these 
measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only 
towards the level of its participation in international trade. To that end we also 
employ, unlike in most studies, proxies measuring the trade policy stance. 
There are indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy 
(Edwards, 1998, Greenaway et al, 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as a 
percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods 
(Owti), trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges 
(Totgvo), as well as sectoral categories of import charges (manufacturing, 
agriculture and resources) can all be considered as good proxies of trade 
restrictiveness and have also been employed in this study. Other measures 
which capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. We used 4 
different categories of non-tariff coverage (Nontar), i.e, overall, manufacturing, 
agriculture and resources respectively, as well as non-tariff barriers on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) as 5 in total broader proxies of 
non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). Since this data is episodic, our study must 
of necessity be cross-sectional rather than a panel data analysis.  
There could be potential endogenity problems associated with the 
dependent variable, wage inequality and the explanatory variable, 
openness/trade policy. First of all, openness when measured by the trade share 
of national income is not truly exogenous, but an outcome of other factors. 
Secondly, the degree of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, 
or the country’s relative factor endowments (Tavares, 1998) may determine a 
country’s trade policy choices. Even under the aegis of structural adjustment 
policies, decisions regarding openness were gradually taken. It may be that 
more egalitarian labour abundant nations may choose to open up faster than 
less equal land (or mineral) abundant nations.  
We need to instrument for the openness and trade policy variables’ 
potential endogenity with wage inequality. The literature establishes the 
predicted trade share following Frankel and Romer (FR) (1999) from a gravity 
equation as an appropriate instrument for openness/trade policy (see, Dollar 
and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004; Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; 
Hall and Jones, 1999). Furthermore, following Rodrik et al (2004), the distance 
from the equator has been chosen as the second instrument for 
openness/trade policy variables because the level of integration of an economy 
depends upon its location in the world map. Our Instrumental Variable (IV) 
regression model is a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimate beginning with: 
iiii DisteqFROPEN 31111 εψτς +++=  (6) 
iiii DisteqFRTP 42221 εψτς +++=   (7) 
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Here stands for predicted trade shares from gravity equations computed 
by Frankel and Romer (1999), whereas (distance from the equator) is a proxy 
for geography. In the first stage, equation (6) and equation (7) have been used 
to generate predicted values of openness and trade policy variables by 
regressing them on the two instruments. The predicted openness and trade 
policy variables are then employed in equation (4) and equation (5) 
respectively, as the second and final stage of the regression analysis.  
3 RESULTS 
Before we carry out the IV analysis, it is informative to look at simple bivariate 
relations between integration (predicted trade shares and predicted tariff rates) 
with the Theil index. The first graph in figure 2 shows that increases in trade 
shares after liberalization leads to higher inequality, and the second graph also 
suggests that decreases in import tariffs exerts a negative and unequal 
distributional effect on wages. One of the reasons for the decrease in relative 
wages of unskilled labour, as tariffs fall, is that the heavily protected sectors in 
many developing countries tend to be industries that employ a high proportion 
of unskilled workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004).  
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Table 1a and 1b (Appendix 1) gives IV regression results with 58 different 
specifications. The results confirm the findings of figure 2. All openness and 
trade policy variables carry expected signs, and nearly all of them are 
significantly related to wage inequality. It would, therefore, appear that trade 
liberalization does worsen the distribution of wages between skilled and 
unskilled labour in developing countries. We have also carried out a robustness 
test to further check the role of trade in increasing wage inequality by 
regressing 28 selected proxies of openness and trade policy on the Theil index 
in equation (4) and equation (5) with 5 more proxies of skilled labour (i.e., 
60skills , 70skills , 75skills , 80skills , 85skills ). We found in all the 145 
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cases, trade exacerbates inequality; the relationship is significant in 112 cases 
out of these 145 (table 2, appendix 1). 
Furthermore, the results in table 1a and 1b show that initial skill 
endowments is negatively related to inequality showing that developing 
countries that are more educated to begin with do well on wage inequality. This 
is expected, and in line with the theory that countries where the skill 
endowment is more evenly distributed, are less prone to an adverse wage 
distributional effect (Fisher, 2001; Tuelings and van Rens, 2002; Eiche, 2001; 
Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Tilak, 1989).  
Figure 3 shows that trade liberalization also augments skills in developing 
countries. This is true because increased exposure to international trade is 
followed by technology transfer, which improves the general skill level. This 
means that part of the human capital stock is endogenous to the processes of 
openness, as hinted at by many endogenous growth models. Here a change in 
skilled human capital which is endogenous to integration will have its own 
independent effect on relative wages and inequality. And this effect will be 
different to that which is attributable to the level of human capital 
endowment/educated population in a country.  
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows two graphs. The first one illustrates a simple relationship 
between skill levels in 1999 and wage inequality, and suggests that countries 
with higher stocks of skilled labour will have less inequality. The second graph 
has a different measure of skills in 1999 (based on predicted values; those skills 
that are acquired as a consequence of trade), conversely suggests that skill 
accumulation due to greater global integration raises wage inequality. This 
suggests that the skills that are directly accrued through the processes of trade, 
contributes to wage inequality. This is in line with Tinbergen’s (1975) 
arguments, and our earlier discussion regarding the dual role of skilled human 
capital in the economy. 
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In order to examine the dual (positive and negative) impact of skilled 
labour stocks on the skilled-unskilled labour wage differential, we modify our 
basic ‘wage inequality model’ by introducing an interaction term between skills 
and some selected openness and trade policy measures.  
Conceptually speaking, our wage inequality framework should contain: 
]),([( 0SkillsopennessSkillsfInequality i=  (8) 
 (+) (-) 
]),([( 0SkillsytradepolicSkillsfInequality i=   (9) 
 (+) (-) 
Here we already know from our early discussion that the countries which 
have higher initial skill endowments perform well on the inequality front, as 
suggested by the second argument on the right-hand-side of (8) and (9). 
However, the skills which are accrued through trade liberalization exacerbate 
inequality especially in developing countries where a large portion of the 
population is unskilled and uneducated. To capture the longitudinal effects of 
skill accumulation in society we have 1skills which contains the effect of 
greater openness or trade policies aimed at liberalization. In summary, 
0skills refers to the skills level for the initial period where it is exogenous to 
trade, whereas iskills refers to the skill levels after a period of time when the 
processes of trade openness or liberalized trade policies alter the stock of 
human capital.  
The econometric form of our modified wage inequality model is:  
iiii SkillsSkillsOPENnInteractioTHEIL 51113 65)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=   (10) 
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iiihyri
SkillsSkillsOPENnInteractioTHEIL 62224 65)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=  (11) 
iiii SkillsSkillsTPnInteractioTHEIL 73335 65)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=  (12) 
iiihyri
SkillsSkillsTPnInteractioTHEIL 84446 65)99( ερλ ++×Ω+=  (13) 
Note that 65skills  represents initial skill endowments in 1965, whereas 
captures skill accumulation in 1999 - a point in time when earlier trade 
liberalization has had time to play a role in skill accumulation in developing 
countries through technology transfer. The interaction terms capture the effect 
of skills on inequality, while taking into account the extent to which each 
developing country is integrated with world markets. Average years of 
schooling is our first proxy for skills. Since there is evidence which suggests 
unequal investments in higher education are important determinants of 
increasing inequalities in developing countries (Barro, 1999), we also utilize 
average years of higher schooling in addition to average years of schooling as 
the second proxy for skilled labour. This gives us interaction terms based on 
two categories of skill levels. The interaction term 
)99( SkillsOPENnInteractio × and )99( SkillsTPnInteractio × are based on 
the first category of skills and represents the general skill level proxied by 
overall years of schooling in the total population at age 25 for 1999 and the 
interaction term hyrSkillsOPENnInteractio )99( × and 
hyrSkillsTPnInteractio )99( × are based on average years of higher schooling in 
the total population at age 25 for the same year. The later category will give us 
more specific information about the relationship between inequality and higher 
education. To investigate integeration we employ six definitions of openness: 
Lcopen, Impen1o, Impen2o, Tars1o, Tars2o and Open80 and 5 different proxies of 
trade policy namely Tariffs, Owti, Txtrdg, Owqi, and Heritage 1 (see Appendix 3 
for detailed variable definitions).  
Before obtaining the interaction terms, we have once again instrumented 
for openness, trade policy and skills in order to resolve the endogeneity 
problem which might exist between openness/trade policy and skill levels.2  
iii FROPEN 9112 εθφ ++=   (14) 
iii FRTP 10222 εθφ ++=   (15) 
iiii PTRTLEXSkills 11εϕτη +++=   (16) 
Note here that we are not exactly running a conventional two stage least 
square analysis where in the first stage the common instruments enter all the 
first stage equations. In our case there is no common instrument for 
openness/trade policy and Skills. For openness and trade policy variables we 
used the standard instrument namely predicted FR trade shares in an attempt 
to gauge how more liberalized trade policies modify the role of skills in 
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determining wage inequality (equation 14 and equation 15).3 The two proxies 
for skills are instrumented by total public spending on education as a 
percentage of GDP (TLEX) and primary pupil-teacher ratio (PTR) in equation 
(16). 
Table 3 (Appendix 1) shows results for our instrumental variables, 
shedding light on the robustness of instruments we have chosen. The results 
show that the FR instrument works well for openness proxies if we consider 
the t values. However, with the exception of Lcopen the coefficients and 
standard errors for all the openness proxies are large showing that they violate 
low-power over identification restrictions. In the case of trade policy 
indicators, though the t values are smaller, they are significant in most cases 
with smaller standard errors and coefficients, indicating the robustness of the 
FR instrument for trade policy proxies. Average years of schooling (Skills99) 
have a positive association with public spending on education (TLEX), and a 
negative relationship with pupil teacher ratio (PTR). Both these instrumental 
variables carry expected signs when related to basic education (Skills99), 
because on the one hand, governments in developing countries have lately 
been spending resources on primary education in order to improve literacy 
rates at the behest of donors, and on the other hand, a high pupil-teacher ratio 
is one of the main causes of school drop-outs.4 The result for average years of 
higher schooling (Skills99hyr) when related to PTR is similar to that for basic 
education (Skills99). However, the relationship between Skills99hyr and TLEX 
is insignificant. This is because governments in developing countries either 
spend on basic education or on tertiary education, putting less emphasis on 
secondary education.  
Table 4a and 4b (Appendix 1) show 65Skills  is negatively related to 
inequality for 15 out of 22 specifications of equations (10), (11), (12) and (13), 
confirming our earlier results that countries with a better initial school 
attainment do well apropos inequality. The coefficients for Skills65 are, 
however, insignificant in the presence of post-liberalization skill levels that are 
interacted with openness/ trade policy proxies.  
The results in table 4a demonstrate that )99( SkillsOPENnInteractio ×  
term enters the inequality equation insignificantly, and 
hyrSkillsOPENnInteractio )99( × enters the inequality equation insignificantly 
in 4 out of 5 cases, being significant only in the case of lcopen, suggesting 
limited role played by openness per se in determining wage inequality once we 
control for openness proxies for skill level. This result supports Dollar and 
Kraay (2004), who found that openness does not carry any significant effects 
on inequality. Nevertheless, the significance of Lcopen for 
hyrSkillsOPENnInteractio )99( ×  implies that greater openness may only 
benefit those who have a minimum threshold level of skills, such as high 
school degree/ diploma. Whereas the insignificance of 
)99( SkillsOPENnInteractio × suggests that basic education in itself as a target 
is not enough to contain wage dispersion when the economy begins to trade 
more with the outside world, perhaps there is a need for a balanced education 
policy in the South. The provision of the necessary higher/technical education 
should be done in a way so that it does not compromise the achievement of 
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primary education (see Boeren and Hotland, 2005). Primary education is the 
first step towards more skilled labour force, and it is a pro-poor policy as the 
overwhelming majority of the poor remain uneducated (Mamoon, 2005).  
Let us now turn to the analysis of the effect of trade policy measures, 
leaving aside general openness outcomes. As noted earlier, general openness is 
an outcome of earlier policies, and it either does not significantly effect wage 
inequality, or it may even reduce wage disparities if openness is a consequence 
of policies promoting competitive industrialization. Table 4b shows that the 
interaction terms for trade policy variables. 
)99( SkillsTpnInteractio × and hyrSkillsTPnInteractio )99( ×  and always enter 
equation (12) and equation (13) significantly, with a negative sign. The 
significance of trade policy variables in contrast to general openness indicators 
suggests that labour market inequalities are more closely related to trade 
policies. The negative sign implies that more open trade policies worsen wage 
inequality. These findings are in line with the results shown in figure 4. The 
simple interpretation is that skills accrued through processes of liberalization 
seem to complement trade liberalization in worsening the gap between the 
haves and have-nots in developing countries. This may be due to a 
“protection” effect. Generally, developing countries protect unskilled-labour 
intensive goods prior to liberalization. So after liberalization the producers of 
unskilled intensive good face increased costs amid more outside competition, 
and their real wages and living standards decline in the absence of government 
subsidies. 
Another way of looking at the results in table 4b is to consider 
government revenue effects. Decreasing tariffs may lead to a fall in public 
revenues, with serious repercussions for development expenditure, especially 
education spending. In this respect, we could say that there is complementarity 
between unequal education policies, which result is qualitative and quantitative 
constraints in the education sector, and a more open trade policy.  
The literature suggests that in most developing countries skills are 
unevenly distributed (Ravallion, 2003). Thomas, Wang and Fan (2000) and 
Domenech and Castello (2002) find that Gini coefficient of the distribution of 
human capital in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia are the highest (most 
unequal) in the world. Berthelemy (2004) arrives at the same conclusion not 
only for Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia, but also for Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). Another important observation which can be made 
from table 4b is that the coefficients on hyrSkillsTPnInteractio )99( ×  are 
higher than the coefficients on )99( SkillsTPnInteractio × . This may indicate 
that the stock of highly skilled labour in developing countries is closely linked 
to free market policies in explaining the degree of wage inequality. In other 
words, either open-door policies, or a bias in educational expenditure in favour 
of higher education, exacerbates the skilled labour wage premium.  
In the developing world, governments focus more attention on higher 
education compared to primary education. The distribution of public resources 
on education is highly unequal, as shown in Table 5 based on Chowdhury 
(1994). The higher education bias widens disparities in incomes among 
different skill levels, following greater trade liberalization. In many countries a 
 18
considerable proportion of public expenditures for education benefits middle 
and upper-income families, because richer groups are over-represented at all 
levels of education, particularly at the university level. From Table 5 we can 
gauge that in African countries, public expenditure per student on higher 
education is 28 (Francophone Africa) and 50 (Anglophone Africa) times 
greater than the level on primary education. For developing countries as a 
whole, only 7 % of the relevant population enrol in higher education. 
Table 5 
Public Expenditure per Student as a % of Per Capita GNP by Region  
(circa 1980) 
Region   Primary  Secondary  Higher  
Anglophone Africa  18  50  920  
Francophone Africa  29  143  804  
South Asia   8  18  119  
East Asian and Pacific  11  20  118  
Latin America   9  26  88  
Middle East and North  2  28  150  
Africa    14  41  370  
Developing Countries  22  24  49  
 
 
Source: Mingat and Tan (1985) cited in Chowdhury (1994).  
  
 
As shown in Table 6 (appendix 2), the share of public spending on 
education in Latin America that is allocated to higher education has tended to 
be high -- more than 20 % on average, compared to 15 % on average in East 
Asia. Venezuela and South Korea are extreme examples of this phenomenon. 
While in the early 1990s Venezuela allocated 35 % of its public education 
budget to higher education, South Korea allocated just 8 % of its budget to 
post-secondary schooling. Public expenditure on education as a percentage of 
GNP was actually higher in Venezuela (5.1) than in Korea (4.5). However, 
after subtracting the share going to higher education, public expenditure 
available for basic education as a proportion of GNP was considerably higher 
in Korea (3.6) than in Venezuela (1.3). 
Birdsall (1999) summarises the debate on education and inequality with 
reference to Latin America and East Asia:  
By giving priority to expanding the quantity of education and improving quality 
at the base of the educational pyramid, East Asian governments stimulated the 
demand for higher education, while relying to a large extent on the private sector 
to satisfy that demand. In Latin America, government subsidies have 
disproportionately benefited high-income families whose children are much more 
likely to attend university. At the same time, low public funding of secondary 
education has resulted in poorly qualified children from low-income backgrounds 
being forced into private universities or opting out of the education system at 
higher levels. (p. 11) 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, our discussion suggests that the earning inequalities which we 
witness in developing countries have two important determinants. First there 
are significant entrenched inequalities in educational attainment. Second, 
increased international trade transforms these education inequalities into wage 
inequalities by favouring skilled labour over unskilled labour. In line with 
previous studies we have found that education may be central to explaining the 
increasing gap in relative wages between skilled and unskilled workers in 
developing countries. Though our analysis supports the argument that those 
countries with a higher initial level of human capital do well on the inequality 
front, it also suggests that human capital, particularly the part related to higher 
education, which accrues after trade liberalization has inegalitarian effects. 
Governments in developing countries tend to invest more in higher education 
at the cost of primary education in order to seize short-term benefits from 
globalization.  
One reason for this bias in education policies in developing countries 
towards higher education may lie in the belief that elementary education has a 
very limited direct role in determining growth rates. According to Barro (1999) 
the rate of economic growth responds more to secondary or higher education 
levels rather than elementary schooling. International trade in manufactures 
and services is considered to be one of the key engines for growth. This often 
requires college graduates, or those who have at least finished high school. One 
reason why India and China have become havens for international outsourcing 
and trade is because they have managed to accumulate relatively educated and 
skilled human capital by investing in higher education.5 In the last two years, 
the United States has lost two million manufacturing jobs to China, India and 
other third world countries, mainly in the Far East. Consequently, in 2001, the 
manufacturing sector in the USA had shrunk to just 18% of GNP from 48 % 
in 1950 and it is expected to recede to just 10 or 11% within the next 10 years.6 
Forrester Research, a market research firm predicts that at least 3.3 million 
white-collar jobs and $ 136 billion in wages will shift from the US to low cost 
countries by 2015, whereas, most of them will find their way to Indian or 
Chinese centres.7 Countries in the South that are set to benefit most from 
globalization are those that have transformed at least a segment of their labour 
force into relatively skill intensive by investing in higher education 
programmes. So it is no surprise that in order to participate in the race to be 
competitive, many developing countries have a tendency to invest in higher 
education at the cost of primary education to achieve greater growth. For 
example, Pakistan’s current education policy is skewed towards higher 
education. In fiscal year 2003, the government increased its higher education 
budget to Rs 5 billion from Rs 800 million five years ago - an increase of nearly 
400%. In 2004, the government doubled the previous year’s expenditure on 
higher education. The budget for primary education, by contrast, increased by 
a meagre average of 4% per annum for the last few years. This apparent pro-
growth higher education policy of Pakistan at the expense of primary 
education may very well accelerate growth, but it definitely excludes the poor 
and unskilled, and will subsequently lead to increased wage and income 
disparities in the country.  
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As noted earlier, governments in developing countries tend to focus their 
education policies on higher education in the anticipation that this investment 
will yield quick dividends in the current international business environment. 
Though they are right, they need to realize that promoting higher education at 
the cost of primary education breeds greater income inequality in the absence 
of countervailing policies, and is not pro-poor. Consequently, governments 
need to increase the mean level of human capital through a balanced education 
policy where primary education is given as much importance as higher 
education. An equitable education policy will decrease the skilled-unskilled 
wage premium, as the overall supply of low skilled and uneducated workers 
goes down and the supply of educated workers increases, as well as give rise to 
general equilibrium effects that reduce wage inequality. Also such policies are 
consistent with the millennium development goals (MDGs). We agree with the 
recent World Development Report (2006) which suggests that wider access to 
education and jobs could "level the economic playing field" and improve 
livelihoods. 
Our results also have implications for the speed at which trade policies are 
liberalized. Developing countries require time to adjust to an open regime 
because of their low skill level stocks; the implication being that better 
educated nations should liberalize faster. If skill levels were homogenously 
distributed, free trade would lead to a more equal and pro poor growth. In the 
immediate time frame, it would be wiser for developing economies to first look 
for regional trade agreements by following the model of European Union. The 
rationale for regional trade is that developing countries lie in a heterogenic 
plain where each country is located at different stages of the technical ladder. 
To climb the ladder, the more efficient way may lie in increased South-South 
trade rather than North-South trade in a regional framework as in the case of 
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Network). Similar trade agreements 
would enable developing countries to slowly liberalize their economies, while 
at the same time enabling their work force to ascend the skill ladder (Mamoon, 
2004).  
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NOTES  
 
1 The Heritage Foundation has created an index of overall "economic freedom", and 
the index runs from one (a score signifying institutions and policies most conducive to 
economic freedom) through five (least conducive).  
2 Since we are using skills for year 1999, there is high probability that there are 
endogeniety problems between skill levels and selected openness/ trade policy 
variables. 
3 It is useful to note that we also predicted Openness and Trade policy variables by 
regressing them on both FR and Disteq. The results did not change for most, but for 
Owti the interaction terms became insignificant; Owti represents tariffs on intermediate 
and capital goods, from the Sachs and Warner (1995) composite measure of openness. 
The Sachs-Warner criteria defines a country as open if (i) non-tariff barriers cover less 
than 40 percent of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less than 40 percent, (iii) the black 
market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1980s, (iv) the economy is not 
socialist, and (v) the government does not control major exports through marketing 
boards. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) argue that in many cases the Sachs-Warner 
measures can be replaced by an Africa dummy. In which case, Disteq is not a good 
instrument for owti as well as Open80.  
4See:.http://www.heros-inc.org/star-press-release.pdf and 
http://www.ecs.co.sz/cca/cca_5.html.  
5 In other export areas such as textiles which use unskilled labour intensively, these 
countries vast populations dictate that the skilled-unskilled premia will not narrow 
even if the absolute real wages of the unskilled increases.  
6 http://www.freenewport.com/us/useconomy.asp 
7 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040223/login/main1.htm 
APPENDIX 1 
Table 1a 
IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^ 
 1 2  1 2  1 2 
lcopen 0.0297 0.039 impen2
m 
0.0028 0.0024 tars1r 0.0039 0.0033 
 (1.19) (2.19)**  2.32** (2.07)**  (3.02)* (2.48)** 
skills65  -0.015 skills65  -0.015 skills65  -0.0112 
  (-2.32)**   (-1.75)***   (-1.60) 
F-test 1.42 4.14** F-test 5.38** 2.94** F-test 9.11* 4.19** 
 n 97 63  n 71 51  n 72 51 
2R  0.03 0.08 2R    2R   0.21 
impen1o 0.0021 0.0016 impen2
a 
0.0109 0.009 tars2o 0.00047 0.0008 
 (2.4)** (2.08)**  (2.23)** (2.01)**  (1.62) (2.07)** 
skills65  -0.0157 skills65  -0.012 skills65  -0.015 
  (-1.82)***   (-1.44)   (1.79)*** 
F-test 5.74** 3.02*** F-test 4.97** 2.99*** F-test 2.62 2.98*** 
 n 72 51  n 71 51  n 69 50 
2R    2R    2R    
impen1
m 
0.0035 0.002 impen2
r 
0.0059 0.0038 tars2m 0.0012 0.0017 
 (2.46)** (2.15)**  (2.28)** (2.28)**  (1.67)*** (1.94)*** 
skills65  -0.016 skills65  -0.012 skills65  -0.017 
  (-1.90)***   (-1.66)***   (-
1.79)*** 
F-test 6.05** 3.14*** F-test 5.19** 3.55** F-test 2.8*** 2.57*** 
 n 72 51  n 71 51  n 69 50 
2R    2R    2R    
impen1a 0.0011 0.0095 tars1o 0.0012 0.0009 tars2a 0.0080 0.0039 
 (2.35)** (2.09)**  (2.60)* (2.15)**  (1.76)*** (1.53) 
skills65  -0.012 skills65  -0.016 skills65  -0.014 
  (-1.44)   (-1.92)***   (-1.53) 
F-test 5.51** 2.99*** F-test 6.77* 3.17*** F-test 3.10*** 1.88 
 N 72 51  n 72 51  n 69 50 
2R    2R    2R  
 
  
impen1r 0.0107 0.0090 tars1m 0.0026 0.0018 tars2r 0.0009 0.0024 
 (1.98)** (1.77)***  (2.23)** (1.98)***  (1.34) (2.32)** 
skills65  -0.017 skills65  -0.0189 skills65  -0.012 
  (-1.65)***   (-1.95)***   (-1.61) 
F-test 3.94** 2.14 F-test 4.96** 2.7*** F-test 1.80 3.67** 
 n 72 51  n 72 51  n 69 50 
2R    2R    2R   0.09 
impen2o 0.0016 0.0012 tars1a 0.0051 0.0045 tariffs -0.024 -0.0072 
 (2.37)** (2.17)**  (2.09)** (1.54)  (0.66) (-1.36) 
skills65  -0.014 skills65  -0.0133 skills65  -0.025 
  (-1.73)***   (-1.54)   (-2.09)** 
F-test 5.61** 3.23** F-test 4.37** 1.95 F-test 0.44 2.20 
 n 71 51  n 72 51  n 64 48 
2R    2R    2R    
* , **and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 3. 
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Table 1 b 
IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^ 
 1 2  1 2 
owti -0.298 -0.254 owqi -0.4228 -0.02975 
 (-2.03)** (-1.87)***  (-1.29) (-1.00) 
skills65  -0.0132 skills65  -0.016 
  (-1.48)   (-1.29) 
F-test 4.11** 2.42 F-test 4.59** 0.93 
 n 70 51  n 69 51 
2R    2R    
totgvo -0.0028 -0.0017 nontaro -0.0022 -0.0018 
 (-2.66)* (-2.02)**  (-2.20)** (-1.77)*** 
skills65  -0.0111 skills65  -0.0210 
  (-1.28)   (-1.76)*** 
F-test 7.06* 2.51*** F-test 4.85** 1.96 
 n 69 49  n 69 49 
2R    2R    
totgvm -0.0026 -0.0015 nontarm -0.0022 -0.0019 
 (-2.65)* (2.01)**  (-2.10)** (-1.70)*** 
skills65  -0.0118 skills65  -0.022 
  (-1.34)   (-1.73)*** 
F-test 7.02* 2.50*** F-test 4.85** 1.80 
 n 69 49  n 69 49 
2R    2R    
totgva -0.0027 -0.0018 nontara -0.0026 -0.0027 
 (-2.75)* (-2.10)**  (-1.97)** (-1.52) 
skills65  -0.071 skills65  -0.0329 
  (-1.29)   (-1.66)*** 
F-test 7.58* 2.70*** F-test 3.87** 1.49 
 n 69 49  n 69 49 
2R    2R    
totgvr -0.0049 -0.0026 nontarr -0.0016 -0.0009 
 (2.14)** (-1.78)***  (-2.42)** (-1.81)*** 
skills65  -0.0045 skills65  -0.009 
  (-0.46)   (-1.13) 
F-test 4.59** 1.97 F-test 5.87** 2.11 
 n 69 49  n 69 49 
2R  _ _ 2R    
* , **and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 3. 
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Table 2 
Inequality Trade Nexus 
(dependent variable) Theil Index (T) Openness/ 
Trade Policy 
60skillsT  65skillsT  70skillsT  75skillsT  80skillsT  85skillsT  
lcopen  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
oimpen1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
mimpen1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
aimpen1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
rimpen1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
× 
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
oimpen2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
mimpen2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
aimpen2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
rimpen2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
otars1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
mtars1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
atars1  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
Significant  
rtars1  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
otars2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
mtars2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
atars2  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
rtars2  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
tariffs  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
owti  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
txtrg  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
totgvo  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
totgvm  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
totgva  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
totgvr  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
owqi  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
nontaro  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
× 
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
nontarm  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
×  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
× 
nontara  
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
 
× 
nontarr  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
 
Significant  
- significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Note: The skills, which range from 1960 to 1985, represent the base line skills or initial factor endowments and 
thus are assumed to be exogenous in our wage inequality equation (eq.3). Here, the openness and trade 
policy variables are the only ones which are instrumented for on FR trade shares and Disteq. 
Table 3 
Regression Results for Instrumental Variables 
 
 
 
 
  
 Independent Variables 
Instruments lcopen Impen1o Impen2o Tars1o Tars2o Open80 Tariffs Owti Txtrdg Owqi Heritage Skills99 Skills99(HYR)ª 
 
Logfrankrom 
 
0.524 
 
16.70 
 
19.38 
 
28.65 
 
41.58 
 
0.213 
 
-1.025 
 
-0.068 
 
0.0037 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.363 
  
 (13.41)* (7.85)* (7.73)* (7.53)* (3.90)* (2.97)* (-0.90) (-3.47)* 0.63 (-1.77)*** (-2.15)** 
 
  
TLEX            0.22 -0.0001 
            (1.59)*** (-0.01) 
PTR            -0.140 -0.012 
            (-8.32)* 
 
(-6.34)* 
N 147 95 94 95 92 60 97 97 54 95 94 64 64 
F 179.1* 61.5* 59.6* 56.7* 15.2* 8.80* 0.81 12.04* 0.40 3.13*** 4.64* 51.8* 24.9 
2R  0.55 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.14 0.13 0.0084 0.11 0.0077 0.03 0.04 0.63 0.44 
*, **and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 ª Higher Education  
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Table 4a 
Interaction Terms for Openness Variables 
*, **and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
  Dependent Variable: Theil Index
Independent Varibles 
 
 Specifications for (
99Skills ) Specifications for ( 99sationSkillHigherEduc ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Interaction(Lcopen × Skill99) -0.0023            
 (-1.53)      -0.041      
Interaction(Lcopen × Higher EducationSkill99)       (-2.14)**      
             
Interaction(Impen1o × Skill99)  0.00002           
  (0.17)           
Interaction(Impen1o × Higher EducationSkill99)        -0.0007     
        (-0.40)     
Interaction(Impen2o × Skill99)   0.00003          
   (0.31)          
Interaction(Impen2o× Higher EducationSkill99)         -0.0004    
         (-0.23)    
Interaction(Tars1o× Skill99)    0.0006         
    (0.09)         
Interaction(Tars1o × Higher EducationSkill99)          -0.0005   
          (-0.56)   
Interaction(Tars2o × Skill99)     0.00002        
     (0.34)        
Interaction(Tars2o × Higher EducationSkill99)           -0.0001  
           (-0.17)  
Interaction(Open80 × Skill99)      0.001       
      (0.12)       
Interaction(Open80× Higher EducationSkill99)            -0.07 
            (-0.42) 
Skills65 -0.0009 -0.0092 -0.0088 -0.009 -0.0096 -0.0091 0.001 -0.0071 -0.007 -0.0006 -0.008 -0.006 
 (-0.12) 
 
(-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.29) (-1.19) (0.23) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.84) (-1.04) (-0.86) 
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
F 2.01* 0.80 0.47 0.79 0.84 0.79 3.18** 0.87 0.02 0.92 0.80 0.90 
2R  0.10 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
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Table 4b 
Interaction Terms for Trade Policy Variables 
*, **and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
 
 Dependent Variable: Theil Index
Independent Variables Specifications for ( 99Skills ) Specifications for ( 99sationSkillHigherEduc ) 
 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Interaction(Tariffs × Skill99) -0.0013          
 (-2.66)*          
Interaction(Tariffs × Higher EducationSkill99)      -0.017     
      (-2.87)*     
Interaction(Owti × Skill99)  -0.0619         
  (-2.65)*         
Interaction(Owti × Higher EducationSkill99)       -0.9076    
       (-2.89)*    
Interaction(Txtrdg × Skill99)   -0.306        
   (-1.66)***        
Interaction(Txtrdg× Higher EducationSkill99)        -5.105   
        (-2.24)**   
Interaction(Owqi× Skill99)    -0.006       
    (-2.76)*       
Interaction(Owqi × Higher EducationSkill99)         -0.952  
         (-2.96)*  
Interaction(Heritage × Skill99)     -0.004      
     (-2.70)*      
Interaction(Heritage × Higher EducationSkill99)          -0.056 
          (2.90)* 
Skills65 0.0034 -0.0016 -0.002 -0.0001 0.003 0.0037 -0.0001 0.002 0.0011 0.0037 
 (0.007) 
 
(-0.25) (-0.03) (-0.02) (0.44) (0.50) (-0.02) (0.29) (0.16) (0.49) 
           
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
F 4.49* 4.46* 2.23** 4.76* 4.59* 5.10* 5.15* 3.40* 5.36* 5.16* 
2R  0.20 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.22 
APPENDIX 2 
Table 6 
Budget Allocated to Higher Education, 1990-94 
EAST ASIA %age of Overall Education Budget 
Malaysia 17 
Thailand 17 
Indonesia 18 
Korea, Rep. 8 
Average (simple) 15 
  
LATIN AMERICA  
Argentina 17 
Brazil 26 
Chile 20 
Colombia 17 
Costa Rica 31 
Dominican Republic 11 
Ecuador 23 
Honduras 20 
Mexico 14 
Uruguay 25 
Venezuela 35 
Average (simple) 22 
 
Source: UNDP (1997) citing BIRDSALL, Nancy, “Education: the People’s Asset”, CSED 
Working Paper No. 5, 1999 
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APPENDIX 3 
Data and sources 
Black: Black Market Premium, Year: 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: 
Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
Heritage: Heritage Foundation Index, Source: Rose (2002). 
Skills60: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1960. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills65: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1965. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills70: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1970. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills75: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1975. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills80: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1980. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills85: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1985. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills90: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1990. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills95: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1995. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills99: Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: 
Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Skills99hyr: Average Years of Higher Schooling in the Total Population at 25, Year: 
1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
Impen1o: Import Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
 Impen1m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen1a: Import Penetration: Agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen1r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2o: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2a: Import Penetration: Agriculture, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Impen2r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
 33
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) 
imports plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn 
World Tables, Mark 6. 
Logfrankrom: Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following 
Frankel and Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ 
variables. Source: Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Nontaro: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontarm: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: manufacturing, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontara: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: agriculture, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Nontarr: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: resources, 1987. Source: Rose (2002). 
Open80: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002). 
Owqi: Non Trade barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. 
Source: Rose (2002). 
Owti: Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002) 
Ptr: Pupil Teacher Ratio, Primary, Year: 1999, Source: WDI (2002) 
Tars1o: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars1m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars1a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars1r: TARS Trade Penetration: resources, 1985. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars2o: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars2m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1982. Source: Rose (2002). 
Tars2a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1982. Rose (2002). 
Tars2r: TARS Trade Penetration: resourses, 1982. Rose (2002). 
Tariffs: Import Duties as %age imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2002. 
Theil97: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on 
UNIDO2001 by UTIP, Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality 
Project (UTIP) http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
Tlex: Public Spending on Education, Total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 1999, 
Source: WDI (2002) 
Totgvo: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002) 
Totgvm: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: manufacturing, 1985. Source: 
Rose (2002) 
Totgva: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002) 
Totgvr: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: resourses, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002) 
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002) 
APPENDIX 4 
List of Countries for Theil Index 
Afghanistan (1988)  
Algeria (1997) 
Angola (1993)  
Argentina (1996)  
Bahamas, The (1990)  
Bahrain (1992)  
Bangladesh (1990)  
Barbados (1997)  
Belize (1992)  
Benin (1981)  
Bhutan (1989)  
Bolivia (1997)  
Botswana (1997)  
Brazil (1994)  
Burkina Faso (1981)  
Burundi (1990)  
Cameroon (1997)  
Cape Verde (1993)  
Central African Republic (1993)  
Chile (1997)  
China (1985) Colombia (1997) 
 Congo, Rep. (1988) Costa Rica 
(1997) Cote d'Ivoire (1997) Cuba 
(1988) Cyprus (1997)  
Dominican Republic (1985)  
Ecuador (1997) 
Egypt (1997)  
El Salvador (1997)  
Equatorial Guinea (1990)  
Eritrea (1988)  
Ethiopia (1997)  
Fiji (1997)  
Gabon (1994)  
Gambia, The (1981)  
Ghana (1995)  
Guatemala (1997)  
Haiti (1988)  
Honduras (1994)  
Hong Kong, China (1997)  
India (1997) 
Indonesia (1997)  
Iran, Islamic Rep (1993)  
Iraq (1985) 
Jamaica (1990)  
Jordan (1997)  
Kenya (1997) 
Korea, Rep. (1997)  
Kuwait (1997)  
Lesotho (1994)  
Liberia (1985)  
Libya (1980)  
Macao, China (1997)  
Madagascar (1988)  
Malawi (1997)  
Malaysia (1997)  
Mauritania (1978)  
Mauritius (1997) 
Mexico (1997)  
Moldova (1994)  
Mongolia (1994)  
Morocco (1997)  
Mozambique (1994)  
Myanmar (1997)  
Namibia (1994) 
Nepal (1996)  
Nicaragua (1985)  
Nigeria (1994)  
Oman (1997)  
Pakistan (1996)  
Panama (1997)  
Papua New Guinea (1989) 
Paraguay (1991)  
Peru (1994)  
Philippines (1997)  
Puerto Rico (1997)  
Qatar (1994)  
Rwanda (1985)  
Saudi Arabia (1989) 
Senegal (1997)  
Seychelles (1988)  
Singapore (1997)  
Somalia (1986)  
South Africa (1997) 
Sri Lanka (1994)  
St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1994)  
Sudan (1972)  
Suriname (1993) 
Swaziland ((1994) 
Syria (1997) 
Togo (1981) 
Thailand (1994) 
Tonga (1994) 
Trinidad and Tobago (1994) 
Tunisia (1997) 
Turkey (1997) 
Taiwan (1997) 
Tanzania (1990) 
Uganda(1988) 
United Arab Emirates (1985) 
Uruguay (1997) 
Venezuela (1994) 
Western Samoa (1972) 
Yemen (1986) 
Zambia (1994) 
Zimbabwe (1997) 
 
